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INTRODUCTION
For decades, commentators and students of American
business have accepted the basic premise that corporate
leaders should make decisions that they reasonably believe to
be "in the best interests of the corporation, with a view
towards maximizing corporate profit and shareholder gain"
and not to achieve any other social good.' The structure of
* Associate Professor, Law Department, Zickin School of Business, Baruch
College, City University of New York, and Associate Director, Robert Zicklin
Center for Corporate Integrity, Baruch College. The author thanks participants
in the Baruch College, Department of Law, Faculty Scholarship Series as well
as Bernie Sharfman and Andrew Gold. All errors are my responsibility. This
Article's title phrase, "Expanding Duty of Loyalty" comes from Claire A. Hill
and Brett H. McDonnell's article, "Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty," 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769 (2007).
1. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. LAW 1, 5 (2006). Many commentators have taken this to mean that the
duty of the directors is to maximize profits. For the definitive statement of this
view, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33. While the profit-
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our corporate law and governance reflects this outlook and
provides a number of market-based and legal checks on the
behavior of directors and managers by shareholders. Mindful
of these incentives and the possible penalties for failure,
corporate leaders, to varying degrees, dedicate themselves to
taking action that benefits shareholders by pursuing a
profitable bottom line with little regard to how they achieve
it. Although recent events suggest otherwise, this system has
worked reasonably well to create long periods of growth,
dividends and value for investors.2
Proponents of the shareholder wealth or profit-
maximization view of the corporation argue that managers
should act in shareholders' best interests rather than in the
interests of other stakeholders.' Under this model, managers
pursue outcomes that are designed to generate the greatest
long-term profits for the corporation without regard to the
consequences to those outside the corporation. To the extent
that corporate law successfully regulates the behavior of
directors and managers, it does so largely by imposing
fiduciary duties that prevent them from putting their own
interests before those of the shareholders. Noticeably,
corporate law says little about the duties owed by directors
and managers to entities outside the corporation itself.4 This
Article proposes that recent developments in Delaware
corporate fiduciary law suggest that directors owe a duty of
loyalty to stakeholders outside the corporation itself and that
this might be a first step towards judicial recognition of a
duty of corporate social responsibility.
maximization view is now disfavored by some, this paper will not explore the
complexities of this controversy because, for our purposes, the distinction is not
vital. The crucial point is that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors focus
on the interests (broadly defined) of the shareholders and the corporation itself,
not on those of outside stakeholders.
2. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
3. Id.
4. Of course, other areas of law such as taxation, labor, employment and
environmental law have a profound influence on the ways a corporation's
conduct affects outside stakeholders.
[Vol. 52
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I. THE BACKGROUND: DELAWARE'S EXPANDING DUTY OF
LOYALTY
The fiduciary duties of corporate directors have a long
and often confusing history, especially in the courts of
Delaware, the country's primary source for corporate law.5
While directors' fiduciary obligations were traditionally
divided into the separate duties of care, loyalty, and
sometimes good faith, recent decisions in the Delaware courts
expanded the duty of loyalty to encompass all breaches of
fiduciary duty, including actionable bad faith and actionable
breaches of the duty of care.6 Under current law, the duty of
loyalty prohibits not only self-interested transactions but also
knowing breaches of the duty of care, and, importantly,
actions that are illegal even where they are intended to
benefit the corporation and maximize profits.7
While corporate law does a relatively good job of
addressing the interests of the shareholders through the
imposition of fiduciary duties, it does little to encourage
corporate leaders to act with any sense of "social
responsibility."8  Indeed, a corporate board that ignores
negative consequences to communities, the economy and the
environment, might well still be acting with absolute devotion
to its fiduciary duties to the shareholders. A director will
only be liable to shareholders if he makes a decision that is
plainly based on self-enrichment rather than profitability, or
if he knowingly breaches his duty of care or deliberately
approves illegal behavior.9 If, however, he makes a decision
5. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010).
6. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding
Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV 1769, 1769-70 (2007).
7. Strine et al., supra note 5, at 653.
8. The term "corporate social responsibility" can mean a lot of things. As
one commentator has noted, "[tihe debate over corporate social responsibility is
often vague or unrealistic or both." Larry Ribstein, Accountability and
Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432
(2006). For the purposes of this Article, "corporate social responsibility" will
refer to acts through which corporations deliberately choose to benefit (or to not
harm) stakeholders other than shareholders in ways that adversely affect the
bottom line. In this Article "stakeholders" will refer to anyone affected by the
actions of a corporation other than the shareholders themselves, among them
employees, consumers, communities, governments, the environment and
society's desire for law and order.
9. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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that benefits the shareholders but devastates the interests of
other stakeholders, 10 corporate law provides no obvious
sanction. Such a decision might be unethical or immoral
according to a system of beliefs that does not view profits or
shareholder welfare as superior to other values, but it will
likely not be a breach of fiduciary duty unless the decision
actually violates some law-an environmental regulation for
example-that arises outside of the realm of corporate
governance. Given the focus on the rights of shareholders in
corporate law, the most direct remedy for the social ills
produced by such behavior is for the legislature to pass (and
effectively enforce)11 regulatory laws that would provide
penalties powerful enough to cause corporate leaders to avoid
such costly breaches.
Through the business judgment rule, corporate law
provides directors with broad discretion to run and oversee
companies, as long as they believe they are acting in "the best
interests of the company." 2 This rule insulates directors
from liability for good faith decisions that fail to accomplish
the goal of benefitting the corporation and gives them broad
discretion to run companies as they see fit.13 The rule plainly
exists within a broader framework that is designed to create
the greatest profits for shareholders in a number of ways.
First of all, talented and experienced business people would
be less willing to become directors of corporations if they
feared liability for decisions that do not result in profits, and
shareholder welfare is likely maximized by instituting rules
that guarantee that the best possible personnel will take on
positions of leadership. Second, as an empirical matter,
allowing directors to take risks without fear of liability
encourages the kind of risk-taking that has contributed to
10. For example, a corporation might choose to dispose of its waste in the
cheapest possible legal manner. Such a decision might well cause great harm to
a local community although it is also in the best interests of the shareholders.
11. When any actor decides to take illegal action, it takes into account both
the penalty and the likelihood of getting caught. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of
Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133, 134 (1992). As with any lawbreakers, corporations
will not be penalized for every law they violate because regulators cannot
possibly be expected to detect every violation.
12. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
13. Id.
[Vol. 52
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America's unrivalled history as a source of progress and
innovation.14 Indeed, two of the most prominent proponents
of the business judgment rule's broad protections have stated
that "investors' wealth would be lower if managers' decisions
were routinely subjected to strict judicial review." 5
From the point of view of shareholders, the business
judgment rule seems to work well enough. If it did not,
investors would avoid purchasing corporate equities and the
stock market would collapse even further than it already has.
From the perspective of other stakeholders, however, the
picture is mixed. Focused on the best interests of the
corporation and mindful of the limited scope of their fiduciary
duties, directors have frequently ignored or even trampled on
the interests of stakeholders. 16 It is unnecessary to list the
ways conduct that benefits shareholders can harm other
members of the community without resulting in any legal
sanction against the corporation. Neither the law nor the
marketplace has provided effective incentives to change this
reality.
In light of recent developments in Delaware corporate
fiduciary law, this issue takes on further complexity when
corporate directors choose to take action that breaks the law.
Legal scholars have long noted that, without the enforcement
of sufficiently harsh regulatory laws, directors might
rationally choose to break the law in order to create
maximum profits.'7 It might well make sense from the point
of view of profits for a corporation to violate an environmental
14. David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-
Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 216, 217 (2009).
15. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 93; see also Gagliardi v. Trifood
Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that a weaker business
judgment rule "[would be very destructive of shareholder welfare in the long-
term").
16. On the other hand, because the business judgment rule must necessarily
provide the directors with a great deal of discretion, taking into account the
interests of other stakeholders, possibly at the expense of shareholders, is not
necessarily a breach of fiduciary duty. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1433; see e.g.,
the beloved case of Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968).
The court rejected the claim that directors of a baseball team breached fiduciary
duties when making a decision that took into account interests of the
community. Id. Corporate philanthropy or altruism is certainly protected from
review in most cases by the business judgment rule.
17. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a
Duty to Always Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1996).
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regulation where the potential penalty (taking into account
the likelihood of non-enforcement) is less than the expected
savings or increase in earnings. A director accused of
misconduct for authorizing such an action might point out
(accurately) that she chose that course out of devotion and
loyalty to the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. She has directed the corporation to break the
law, but it is not clear how she has breached her fiduciary
duties to the shareholders.
In the wake of the Delaware Supreme Court's 2006
decision in Stone v. Ritter,18 the duty of loyalty emerged as
the dominant expression of a director's fiduciary obligation to
a corporation and its shareholders. Any act made in bad faith
is now also considered an act of disloyalty.19 No longer
confined merely to the requirement that a director must act
in the corporation's best interests rather than his own, the
duty of loyalty also covers such acts as knowing breaches of
the duty of care.20 That is to say, a director acts disloyally if
he does not believe that his actions are in the best interests of
the corporation, either because they were designed to benefit
the director himself or because he knew that he has not taken
care to evaluate them.21 The application of the duty of
disloyalty to classic duty of care cases makes sense because,
as two commentators have noted, by knowingly breaching the
duty of care a director is "taking for herself something which
should otherwise be the corporation's: her attention and
diligence."22
Although traditionally considered an act made in bad
faith, a profit-maximizing decision to break the law does not
fit neatly into any definition of disloyalty 23 because the act
18. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d. 362 (Del. 2006).
19. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6, at 1770.
20. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
21. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 230.
22. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6, at 1795.
23. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 38 ("Trying to squeeze such [illegal]
conduct into the duty of loyalty is like trying to squeeze the foot of Cinderella's
stepsister into Cinderella's slipper-an enterprise equally painful and
fruitless."); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 593 (2008) ("The point is only that
fiduciary obligation and the duty to act lawfully make a bad fit."); Strine et al.,
supra note 5, at 634 (noting that application of Stone's definition of loyalty will
be hardest in situations in which "directors act without an apparent selfish
[Vol. 52
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does not really constitute taking something that should be the
corporation's. 24  Like many calculated risks taken in good
faith, the decision is intended only to help the corporation's
bottom line. Far from necessarily being disloyal, approving
an illegal act designed to help the corporation could (with a
little imagination) be viewed as an act of selflessness by the
directors, because they are risking their own reputations and
risking the possibility of personal liability. Further, since the
usual remedy for breach of fiduciary duty is a shareholder
derivative lawsuit, in order to bring a worthwhile action for
disloyalty, plaintiffs would have to allege that the breach
resulted in real demonstrable damage to a party to whom a
duty is owed (usually the shareholders or the corporation
itself)-and this might not be the case. Nonetheless, the
same courts that have emphasized the centrality of loyalty
continue to regard approval of profit-motivated illegal activity
as a breach of a director's fiduciary duty.2"
In an earlier Chancery Court opinion upon which the
Delaware Supreme Court relied in Stone, Vice Chancellor
Strine referred (mostly joking it appears) to the idea of a
fiduciary duty of "legal fidelity" which could be invoked when
a corporate director causes "the corporation to violate the
positive laws it is obliged to obey."26 Strine rejects the need
for such a duty because, he rightly says, legal fidelity "is
already a subsidiary element of the fundamental duty of
loyalty."27 Nonetheless, in emphasizing that approval of
illegal activity is disloyalty, Strine has left unanswered the
question of how damages should be imposed for such a
breach. In order to adequately sanction illegal conduct
interest to injure the corporation") (emphasis added). Even if we regard
approval of illegal activity as inherently injurious to the corporation, it still is a
stretch to define it as "selfish." Other conceptions of the notion of loyalty might
make it a better fit however. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of
Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 489 (2009) (proposing that
loyalty can also mean being "true").
24. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6, at 1795.
25. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007)
("Delaware law has long been clear on this rather obvious notion: that it is
utterly inconsistent with one's duty of fidelity to the corporation to consciously
cause the corporation to act unlawfully. The knowing use of illegal means to
pursue profit for the corporation is director misconduct.").
26. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003).
27. Id.
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designed to maximize the corporation's profits, Delaware law
must approach the imposition of damages in a manner that
takes into account the harm that such conduct does to
stakeholders outside the corporation. Enforcement of the
duty of loyalty in this way requires a rejection of the profit-
maximization vision of directors' obligations, and necessarily
imposes a morality-based duty of loyalty to outside
stakeholders. By acknowledging a duty towards such
stakeholders, enforcement of the duty of loyalty as it applies
to illegal conduct might be a first step towards a broader duty
of social responsibility in corporate law.
II. THE LAW'S APPROACH TO ILLEGAL CORPORATE CONDUCT
Although the precise definition of directors' fiduciary
duties has long remained unclear, there has always been
virtually universal28 agreement in the courts and by most
scholars that approval of illegal activity constitutes a
breach-even where such activity would result in a net-gain
for the corporation.2 9 Indeed, even in Milton Friedman's well-
known justification of the shareholder wealth-maximization
model, he indicates that business people who relentlessly
pursue profit must still "conform[] to the basic rules of the
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom." 30
Among judges especially, the idea that the successful
pursuit of profits justifies the deliberate violation of law is
preposterous. A 1909 New York case involved the payment of
"hush money" by an amusement park that enabled the park
to stay open on Sundays in violation of a law protecting the
Sunday Sabbath. 1 It appears that the corporation paid the
bribe because it believed that the increased profits it could
earn from opening on Sundays exceeded the price of the bribe
and the potential penalties that might follow.32 The court
28. Many scholars (but apparently few courts) have embraced the notion of
"law-as-price" which views a corporation's decision to break the law as a
"rational choice." See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance With the Law
in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1286-87 (1998).
29. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 31-32.
30. Friedman, supra note 1, at 33 (emphasis added); see also Bainbridge et
al., supra note 23, at 593.
31. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909).
32. See id. at 344.
[Vol. 52
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said that such an illegal payment could not be excused on the
grounds that it was "made for the supposed interest of the
corporation '33 emphasizing that the payment was an ultra
vires act,34 an illegal act and "one bad in morals." 3  As
Patrick J. Ryan points out, the court does not analyze the
case in terms of breach of fiduciary duty and does not suggest
that those who authorized the bribe received any personal
benefit that would trigger the duty of loyalty as it was then
understood. 6 Ryan also notes that, while the court was
concerned with the ultra vires nature of the bribe, it
"unequivocally regards outright law violations as worse than
ultra vires acts."37  Indeed, the court rejects the possibility
that the expenditure might have benefitted the corporation,
simply stating that the funds had been "wasted . . .for the
purposes of corrupting public morals."3  Exhibiting a
refreshingly old-fashioned sense of right and wrong, the judge
ordered the defendant to repay the $800 without addressing
whether his actions might have benefitted the corporation in
the long run.39
Fast forwarding nearly a century, the Delaware Court of
Chancery addressed a similar issue when the managers of a
33. Id. at 345. The court's use of the phrase "supposed interest" reflects a
skepticism by judges that illegal activity might ever actually benefit the
corporation, empirical evidence notwithstanding. Perhaps this arises from the
natural bias judges have in favor of those who follow the law. But just as it is
disingenuous to argue that corporations should be socially conscious because
such an approach must be good for the corporation in the long run, it is
disingenuous to say that all illegal activity will harm the corporation in the long
run. Under the facts in Roth, it is entirely possible that violating the Sunday
restriction would indeed benefit the corporation even if it faced the appropriate
penalties and bad PR as a result.
34. An ultra vires act is one that goes beyond the purposes of the
corporation as outlined in its certificate of in corporation. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 791 (4th ed. 1968). Illegal conduct is always ultra vires because
corporate law restricts statements of purpose to lawful acts. Lawrence A.
Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual
Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1231 (2011).
35. Roth, 64 Misc. at 345.
36. Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the
General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(A) of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413, 449-50
(1991).
37. Id. at 450.
38. Roth, 64 Misc. at 346.
39. See id. at 347.
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venture capital limited liability company attempted to break
into the Brazilian telecommunications market and agreed to
the payment of a bribe in order to secure necessary
government permits.4' To Vice Chancellor Strine, it was
"obvious" under these facts that the plaintiffs would bring a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.41 Further, it was
equally obvious to Strine that "[u]nder Delaware law, a
fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity in an illegal
fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity
will result in profit for the entity."42
III. ILLEGAL CORPORATE CONDUCT AFTER STONE V. RITTER
The Delaware Supreme Court decided Stone v. Ritter in
November 2006.43 A few months after that holding's re-
definition of good faith and its emphasis on the duty of
loyalty, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Stone to two
cases central to the stock options back-dating scandal. The
practice of stock option back-dating is a good example of
illegal conduct plainly designed to benefit the corporation in
the long run without personally benefitting the officers who
approve it. As such, these cases presented facts which would
require the plaintiff to apply Stone's expanded definition of
"loyalty" to defendants whose conduct, though possibly in bad
faith, did not represent self-dealing or disloyalty in the
traditional sense.
In Ryan v. Gifford, a shareholder of Maxim Integrated
Products, Inc. sued members of the board and the
compensation committee for issuing backdated stock options
to the company's CEO over the course of several years.' The
compensation committee had the authority under the
company's shareholder-approved stock option plan to grant
the CEO stock options at a price "no less than the fair market
value of the company's common stock, measured by the
40. Metro Commc'n Corp. v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d
121 (Del. Ch. 2004).
41. See id. at 131.
42. Id. Note that although this case involved a limited liability company,
Strine states his rule broadly enough (he refers to the fiduciary's "entity") that
it can be applied to other fiduciary business relationships including
corporations.
43. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d. 362 (Del. 2006).
44. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007).
[Vol. 52
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publicly traded closing price for Maxim stock on the date of
the grant."45 The plaintiff alleged that, in fact, on nine
occasions, the company issued the options by pricing them
according to a date earlier than the true date of the grant
because the price of the stock had risen since that earlier
date.46 The plaintiff claimed that this violated the stock
option plan and harmed the company because it received
lower payments for the stock when the CEO ultimately
exercised his options later.47
The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs claim failed
on the grounds that it did not adequately allege a breach of
fiduciary duty, and specifically, that there was "no evidence
that the defendants acted intentionally, in bad faith, or for
personal gain."48  Chancellor Chandler rejected the
defendants' motion to dismiss. Citing Stone v. Ritter,
Chandler noted that the bad faith necessary for a valid
breach of fiduciary duty claim may arise "where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law."49
Following Stone's formulation, he concludes that, because
these acts are disloyal to the corporation, they are therefore
made in bad faith and lie outside the protection of the
business judgment rule. ° The defendants did not appear to
assert, and the opinion does not address, that the back-dating
was designed not to benefit those who approved it, but rather
to benefit the corporation by providing deserved
compensation in this manner as an alternative to some other
form of remuneration.
In Desimone v. Barrows,"' shareholders brought a
derivative lawsuit against the corporation for authorizing an
improper grant of stock options to employees.52 In this case,
the corporation provided stock options that were supposed to
be priced on the date of the grant itself.53 Instead, in order to
benefit the grantees, the corporation altered the option date
45. Id. at 346.
46. See id. at 348.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 356.
49. Id. at 357.
50. See id. at 357-58.
51. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).
52. Id. at 913.
53. Id. at 914.
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to a day on which the stock price was at its lowest for the
quarter.54 This practice, while not uncommon, can be illegal
for both tax and accounting reasons.55 Citing his earlier
opinion in Metro Communications, Strine again noted the
"obvious":
In short, by consciously causing the corporation to violate
the law, a director would be disloyal to the corporation
and could be forced to answer for the harm he has caused.
Although directors have wide authority to take lawful
action on behalf of the corporation, they have no authority
knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue,
exposing the corporation to penalties from criminal and
civil regulators. Delaware corporate law has long been
clear on this rather obvious notion; namely, that it is
utterly inconsistent with one's duty of fidelity to the
corporation to consciously cause the corporation to act
unlawfully. The knowing use of illegal means to pursue
profit for the corporation is director misconduct.
6
Strine's use of the term "disloyal" must be viewed in the light
of Stone v. Ritter. The directors did not personally gain from
the improper back-dating, but they nonetheless acted with
disloyalty towards the corporation. In the absence of a
freestanding duty of legal fidelity, we have nowhere else to
put illegal conduct.
IV. PROTECTING THE "VICTIMS" OF ILLEGAL CORPORATE
CONDUCT
Any discussion of profit-maximizing illegal corporate
activity must take a look at the law being broken and
examine the sanctions it imposes outside the realm of
fiduciary duties and corporate governance. Such regulatory
54. Id. at 913.
55. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of
Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 127 (2008).
56. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 934-35 (emphasis added). Writing in his
capacity as a scholar, Strine takes his incredulity even further:
To somehow contend that it is loyal to engage in consciously unlawful
conduct because the directors believed in good faith that the conduct
would be in the best interests of stockholders desiring profits but in bad
faith toward society is, well, silly. Most elementary school students can
grasp the means limitation central to the corporation's mission and,
therefore, to the duty of loyalty owed to it by those who manage it.
Strine et al., supra note 5, at 653.
[Vol. 52
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laws exist to prevent certain kinds of conduct that might hurt
various stakeholders.57 They are designed to achieve this goal
by imposing a penalty on those who breach regulations,
whether they are corporations, other business entities or
individuals. 8  If those penalties are not effective at
preventing the harmful activity, then, in a democratic society,
the government (through legislation or rulemaking) should
strengthen them so that they provide the proper deterrent.
Unfortunately, as in many other areas, the democratic
process does not always produce the ideal result. As Melvin
Eisenberg has pointed out, a well-crafted environmental
regulation might be designed to impose a penalty on a
corporation that exceeds the corporation's likely profit gained
from a violation; but if such a law is ineffectively enforced,
due to a variety of governmental shortcomings, the
corporation will have a strong incentive to violate it anyway.59
Further, as Eisenberg notes, managers themselves are not
likely to be personally penalized for approving illegal actions
because the corporation itself will be considered the primary
wrongdoer. 60  Most importantly, because of well-known
failures in the legislative process (the influence of corporate
lobbyists and campaign donors foremost among them), the
penalties created under law are often simply not adequate to
counter the harm done by their breach.
When a corporation breaks a law, it also, by definition,
acts beyond the purpose for which it was incorporated.
Therefore, it is committing an ultra vires act. The doctrine of
ultra vires has faded in importance in recent years because
57. Virginia Harper Ho puts it nicely in a recent article: "[it is generally
agreed that stakeholder interests matter very much, but are adequately (and
best) protected and advanced outside of corporate law by separate bodies of
regulation, such as labor, environment, or consumer protection regulations, and
by explicit private contracts, which are the proper tools to address social
welfare, equity, and distributional concerns." Virginia Harper Ho, "Enlightened
Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder
Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 72 (2010).
58. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 23, at 593 ("The point is not that
corporations should be allowed to break the law. They should not. If a
corporation breaks the law, criminal sanctions should follow for the entity or the
responsible individuals.").
59. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 32-33.
60. Id. Fiduciary duties, he notes, provide a necessary disincentive for
managers to approve illegal conduct. Id. at 34.
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corporations simply include very broad statements of
corporate purpose in their certificates of incorporation.61
They cannot, however, include illegal activity as a legitimate
corporate purpose.62 Kent Greenfield has persuasively argued
that shareholders and other potential plaintiffs might be able
to protect the interests of other stakeholders by invoking the
doctrine of ultra vires and seeking injunctions when
corporations act illegally.63 One of the great benefits of this
approach, Greenfield points out, is that it does not require
plaintiffs to demonstrate the damages arising from the illegal
activity.'
It is not clear that shareholders would be any more likely
to pursue this avenue rather than some other non-profit-
maximizing approach such as electing a board that will
deliberately take into account the interests of outside
stakeholders. Both penalties under regulatory and criminal
law, as well as injunctions for ultra vires actions, are legal
deterrents against illegal activity authorized by corporate
directors. But acknowledging their effectiveness still does not
explain how the law of fiduciary duties should address the
harm caused to a corporation by such actions.
Since the law plainly regards approval of illegal activity
61. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 59-60
(Found. Press 2002).
62. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law
Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2001).
63. Id. at 1352. While Vice Chancellor Strine and his co-authors do not
emphasize the doctrine of ultra vires, their discussion of the duty of loyalty
sounds very similar:
American corporate law embeds law compliance within the very
mission of the corporation. Loyalty to the corporation's obligation as a
citizen to attempt in good faith to abide by the law is not incidental to a
director's duties, it is fundamental. We find it dismaying that this
point is even arguable.
Strine et al., supra note 5, at 653 n.71.
64. Greenfield, supra note 62, at 1354-55. Prof. Brian J.M. Quinn points
out that "the courts are pretty clear that illegal acts are ultra vires and when a
director causes the corporation to violate the law the director is not acting in the
corporation's best interests and thus violates his/her duty of loyalty to the
corporation." Brian J.M. Quinn, Fiduciary Duties and Illegal Acts, M&A Law
Prof Blog, (March 15, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/
2010/weekll/index.html. But Quinn's brief discussion does not explain how
such acts hurt the corporation or violate the duty of loyalty in either the
traditional sense or the post-Stone sense under Delaware law.
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as a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the law must
provide a remedy for such a breach. This task is relatively
simple with breaches of the traditional duty of loyalty
because the disloyal director likely caused measurable
damage to the corporation. For example, if a director
disloyally votes to award a contract to a company that the
director owns stock in, a court can easily assess damages by
calculating the price that the corporation overpaid for the
service or by calculating the value lost as a result. Similarly,
where a director knowingly fails to act with care on behalf of
the corporation, a court can usually determine the monetary
damages resulting from that lapse.
However, where a director approves illegal activity in
order to maximize profits for the corporation, the resulting
damages are less obvious. After all, it is entirely possible that
an illegal evasion of regulatory law results in increased net
profits for the corporation with no measurable long or short
term downside. 5 Assuming a court is willing to hold that
directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty, determining
the resulting damages might still be a tricky proposition.
A look at the case law is not very helpful because, in the
few opinions available, the illegal conduct almost always
involved some kind of improper payment or similar "waste" of
funds that is easily identified or calculable.66 In the oft-cited
Roth v. Robertson for example, the court simply ordered the
defendant to pay back to the corporation the $800 he used as
an illegal bribe. It was not necessary for the court to
determine how else that bribe had harmed the corporation in
that case. Similarly, in Miller v. AT&T, plaintiff
shareholders brought a derivative action against the company
for its illegal failure to collect an outstanding debt of $1.5
million owed by the Democratic National Committee." While
failure to collect the money might have been a breach of the
duty of diligence, the plaintiffs also alleged that it was an
illegal campaign contribution in violation of federal corporate
65. Ryan, supra note 36, at 455.
66. As one commentator has noted, disgorgement is the traditional remedy
for breach of loyalty. John A. Humbach, Director Liability for Corporate Crimes:
Lawyers as Safe Haven, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437, 443 (2010-2011).
67. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909).
68. Miller v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974).
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campaign spending laws.69 The court allowed the plaintiffs to
bring the suit alleging damages in the amount of that $1.5
million.70 The two most recent prominent Delaware cases to
address the fiduciary implications of approval of illegal
activity were the stock option back-dating cases, Desimone v.
Barrows and Ryan v. Gifford. In those cases, damages could
have been easily calculated because the back-dating resulted
in less money flowing into the company treasury when the
options were exercised at a price lower than they should have
been.7
Unfortunately, these examples do not provide much
guidance in situations where directors deliberately choose to
act illegally in order to benefit the corporation and ostensibly
succeed, for example by evading a regulatory restriction. The
traditional method for calculating damages from this kind of
illegal activity is known as the "net-loss rule."" The rule
imposes damages to the extent that a corporation was
actually harmed by the illegal actions authorized by the
directors. This frequently makes good sense and presents few
difficulties for courts when the illegal conduct results in
losses to the corporation and the shareholders can establish
bad faith on the part of directors.73 The relevance of allowing
a shareholder derivative lawsuit becomes more complicated,
as a number of commentators have pointed out,74 where the
corporation turned a profit as a result of the illegal activity.
Application of the net loss rule in such instances results in no
liability, even though the directors plainly acted disloyally
(under Stone's definition) to the corporation. 75
69. Id. at 762.
70. See id. at 763.
71. But even in these cases, the defendants could have argued that the
back-dating caused no damage because it was used as a creative way of
compensating the employees. Without the back-dating, the company would
likely have had to sweeten the employees' deals by the same amount it would
have lost through the back-dating.
72. Ryan, supra note 36, at 455.
73. Id. ("As a policy matter, there is little point in shielding directors and
officers from derivative liability when the business decision's poor outcome
derives from knowing illegal conduct.").
74. See, e.g., id. at 424; Beveridge, supra note 17, at 743; Thomas A. Uebler,
Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders' Ability to Hold Directors Accountable
for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL J. CORP. L. 199, 218-19 (2008).
75. Ryan sums up the problem nicely:
Obviously, it is possible to make money by violating the law: if the
[Vol. 52
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While virtually all 76 commentators agree that directors
breach a fiduciary duty by knowingly allowing illegal conduct,
few have seriously proposed a rule that would actually
penalize them under corporate law, unless the firm can show
precisely what the damages were. Vice Chancellor Strine and
his co-authors express dismay at the idea that illegal conduct
should not be sanctioned under corporate law, but they limit
legal sanctions to situations in which the corporation suffers
a "major injury":
[U]nless the corporation has itself suffered a major
detriment as a consequence of lawbreaking, the liability
threat to directors is miniscule. Where, however, a
corporation faces major injury as a result of illegal
conduct, we see no reason why corporate fiduciaries
should not face responsibility if they knowingly caused or
tolerated the illegal conduct.7
It is hard to see how such a view is different from those of the
profit-maximization purists7  who might favor allowing
corporate law to ignore illegal activity that improves the
bottom line. Indeed, a refusal to penalize profitable-but-bad
faith illegality reduces such conduct to the same status as the
much less blameworthy self-interested but nonetheless "fair"
transactions.
Corporate law wisely allows directors to make decisions
that benefit themselves when such decisions also help the
corporation. When interested directors vote in favor of self-
gains obtained from corporate deviance exceed the sum of all losses
attributable to the illegal conduct, it is hard to express in monetary
terms just how the corporation has been "damaged" by fiduciary
participation in illegality, or by managerial failure to prevent the
illegal conduct. On the other hand, restricting derivative recovery to
those cases where corporate deviance has resulted in a "net loss" to the
corporation would make corporate doctrine appear to tolerate illegal
activity if the crime did pay.
Ryan, supra note 36, at 452-53.
76. With the possible exception of Stephen Bainbridge. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Does an Intentional Violation of Law = Bad Faith?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 8, 2006), available at http:/www.
professorbainbridge.com/2006/06/does-am-intenti1.html.
77. Strine et al., supra note 5, at 652 n.69; see also Uebler, supra note 74, at
220 ("ITIhe net loss rule's actual damages requirement best serves the interests
of the public and provides the most equitable result for both shareholders and
directors.").
78. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 23, at 594.
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enriching actions they will not be held liable if a court later
determines that the approved action was "fair" to the
corporation, even if their self-serving behavior rose to the
level of bad faith.79 In such a case, it may well be that the
director knowingly abandons her sense of impartiality
because she knows that it will benefit the corporation. 0 If
the director is able to establish fairness, courts will infer
loyalty (despite self-interest) because the decision was made
in the best interests of the corporation."1 This does not offend
our sense of justice because, after all, nobody really got hurt
by the bad faith intentions of the director: the corporation got
as good a deal as it would have gotten absent the self-
interested decision. The bad faith director gets a pass
because, despite his bad faith, the transaction was fair to the
traditional wards of corporate law: the shareholders. The
moralists among us may frown at the director's behavior, but
we will not venture to sue because we cannot point to any
victims or calculate their damages.
The idea of determining the fairness of a transaction
seems entirely alien to any discussion of illegal corporate
conduct, yet the prevailing rule under corporate law provides
precisely the same result. Applying the "net-loss" rule to
approval of illegal activity by corporate directors seems to
parallel application of the fairness doctrine to disloyal
behavior, yet is totally inappropriate. Under the rule,
directors who approve illegal activity may not be liable for
damages if the illegal activity actually provides a net benefit
to the corporation. This seems akin to suggesting that a
decision to approve unlawful activity (though illegal, disloyal
and immoral) is "fair" to the corporation, and therefore not
actionable, because it helped to maximize profits. At least the
79. Strine and his co-authors explain: "Delaware law requires that the
interested party prove that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation,
in the sense that it was on terms as favorable as could have been achieved in an
arms-length deal subject to market competition." Strine et al., supra note 5, at
643. There are, of course, valid policy justifications for this rule: a corporation
ought to be able to benefit from directors' decision to award a company contract
to a certain firm even if that contract will benefit the directors personally if the
decision is fair to the corporation.
80. Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties and the Business
Judgment Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1086 (2009).
81. See id.
[Vol. 52
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result is the same. In cases of either profitable illegal activity
or "fair" disloyalty, a director knowingly breaches a fiduciary
duty (either acting in his own self-interest or authorizing
illegal activity), but incurs no personal liability for that
breach under corporate law because the decision did not
result in a loss for the corporation.
While making an exception for fairness in the case of self-
interested transactions seems right, allowing the same
exception for illegal activity makes no sense. The difference,
of course, is that the obligation to act within the law is the
only fiduciary duty under which the direct victims of the
director's disloyalty are outside the corporation itself.
Although the victims cannot sue under fiduciary law, they do
have a remedy-the one established by the regulation that
was violated. It might, for example, impose a civil or criminal
penalty against the corporation. Further, it might allow a
civil lawsuit by the victims against the corporation or against
those who authorized the illegal activity. Corporate law,
however, does not seem to provide an adequate remedy for
non-shareholder victims of illegal corporate conduct which
current law labels "disloyal." The courts are thus faced with
the problem of how to enforce a duty (loyalty) where the
direct victims of the breach of that duty are not the same as
the people to whom that duty was owed.
V. LOYALTY TO WHOM?
For the fiduciary duty of loyalty to include an obligation
not to break the law, it must provide some kind of sanction
that applies even in cases where the violation did not hurt the
company itself. Under the duty of loyalty as formulated by
the Delaware courts, shareholders will only recover when
they can prove damages. It therefore might seem to make
sense to create an independent duty to obey the law, and for
the rule to mandate a penalty even where the lawbreaking
maximized corporate profits. Bainbridge and other scholars
reject the idea of viewing illegal activity as "per se violation of
the duty of loyalty" because they believe that it would impose
a "significant restriction on the discretionary powers of
boards of directors. ' 2  Supporters of creation of such an
82. Bainbridge et al., supra note 23, at 594. They explain: "After all, the
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independent duty would likely argue that directors do not
have the discretion to choose to break the law. Vice
Chancellor Strine, (writing as judge) opines that an
independent duty of "legal fidelity" is unnecessary and
redundant because it is already covered by the duty of
loyalty. 8 But he too, (writing as a scholar) seems to support a
rule that would not penalize illegal conduct that does not
harm the corporation's bottom line.84 This essentially affirms
the idea that profit-maximization is paramount, even if it
involves bad faith director-approved illegal activity.
In order to penalize illegal activity under the fiduciary
duty of loyalty, we must determine to whom such activity is
disloyal and assess damages based on the harm done to them.
Interestingly, most discussions that support strict fiduciary
duty based sanctions on illegal activity justify their rule by
pointing to stakeholders beyond the confines of the
corporation itself. Any system of rules that categorizes illegal
activity as disloyal must necessarily broaden the sense of a
director's duties to include loyalty to something other than
the welfare of the corporation. Indeed, to understand loyalty
in this context requires an explanation that brings us fairly
close to an acceptance of the notion of corporate social
responsibility and to a view of corporate law that requires
directors to adhere to a sense of moral and ethical justice.
Melvin Eisenberg's approach makes the necessary link
between obeying the law and morality. Working within the
profit-maximization model, 85 Eisenberg rejects the notion that
that goal can be achieved through illegal means, because to
do so would be immoral and dishonest. He says:
point of the business judgment rule is that shareholders should not be allowed
to recover monetary damages simply because the directors made the wrong
decision." Id. at 593. The authors are perhaps confused in their use of the word
'wrong." The business judgment rule protects directors who make decisions
that turn out to be wrong in that they did not benefit the company (for example,
by choosing to drill for oil where none was subsequently found). Proponents of
corporate law sanctions for illegal activity are surely arguing that such actions
are "wrong" in the moral sense, even if they appear to accrue benefit to the
company.
83. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003).
84. Strine et al., supra note 5, at 652 n.69.
85. Eisenberg asserted that profit-motivated illegal conduct is not a
violation of the duty of loyalty. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 38.
[Vol. 52
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For a complex society to thrive, the bulk of its members
must internalize the moral obligation to obey the law.
Similarly, given the dominance of organizations in
complex societies, such a society could not thrive if
individuals believed themselves free of a moral obligation
to obey the law when they acted in an organizational
rather than personal capacity. Therefore, there is a strong
social interest in prohibiting managers from knowingly
causing the corporation to disobey the law in search of
profits. This objective cannot be achieved solely by
criminal and regulatory actions against the corporation.
86
Note the emphasis on the moral obligations of corporate
actors and the negative effect illegal activity would have on
the rest of our complex society.8 7 Eisenberg later says, "[a]
corporate manager who knowingly causes the corporation to
violate the law lacks honesty, because he knows that he is
acting improperly and is violating generally accepted
standards of decency applicable to the conduct of business."8
This statement might actually be wrong as a normative
matter-many might say that the conduct of business in the
United States is typified by deliberate violations of law in
pursuit of maximum profits and a notable absence of decency.
But the important point is Eisenberg's reliance on moral
traits-among them, honesty and decency-and not merely
on obedience to the law. Since the moral deficiencies inherent
in illegal behavior do not necessarily damage the
stockholders, directors who approve such conduct are
violating a duty-can we call it a fiduciary duty?-to someone
outside the corporation itself. It is not just that they are
breaking a law by, for example, polluting a river, it is that
they are also making the continuing success of a complex civil
society more difficult by violating a moral obligation.
Other commentators have also pointed out the moral
dimension created by the law's recognition of a fiduciary
relationship. Hill and McDonnell suggest, for example, that
"fiduciaries are classically supposed to be honest and
86. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
87. Eisenberg supports this argument with choice quotations from the
classic decisions on the issue. For example, in his discussion of Roth v.
Robertson, Eisenberg quotes a section in which the judge emphasizes the
immorality of the offense and its effect on public policy. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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honorable, and simply breaking the law can be seen as
running afoul of that characterization." 9 The authors do not
make much of this rather speculative notion, but it does echo
the more established idea that illegal activity is ultra vires.9°
Establishment of a fiduciary relationship through the
issuance or purchase of stock imposes an obligation on the
directors not only to adhere to the corporation's statement of
purpose (which requires acting within the law) but to behave
in the manner a fiduciary is supposed to behave: honestly and
honorably towards those both inside and outside the
corporation. 91 This takes the notion of "loyalty" beyond the
relationship between the director and shareholder, and
suggests a duty to society as well.
CONCLUSION
Enforcement of a fiduciary duty not to approve illegal
activity is an important first step towards diminishing the
prevalence of the profit-maximization view of the corporation.
Recognizing such action as disloyal is not necessarily
inconsistent with Eisenberg's approach that emphasizes the
immorality and dishonesty required to approve illegal action.
Both ultimately require courts to acknowledge that the
directors of corporations owe duties to people and entities
outside the corporation itself.
Given the near-universal agreement that directors are
not empowered under corporate law to operate corporations
in an illegal fashion, Strine is right to reject the idea of
creating an independent duty of "legal fidelity." The
Delaware courts have already made absolutely clear that
approval of illegal activity is an act of disloyalty under the
state's fiduciary duty law.92 Eisenberg and other scholars are
rightly troubled though, essentially asking the question:
89. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6, at 1785 n.85.
90. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
91. Blair and Stout also acknowledge the ethical dimension of the fiduciary
relationship, comparing directors to trustees "whose duties are imbued with a
similar moral weight." Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 316 (1999). While they do not
emphasize duties to those outside the corporation, the authors note the power of
"corporate cultural norms of fairness and trust" to influence the behavior of
directors. Id.
92. See supra Part III.
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disloyal to whom? The answer lies in Eisenberg's own
formulation: approval of illegal activity is disloyal to the
system of moral obligations which allows corporations to
function in the first place. 93
In order for the duty of loyalty to mean anything when
applied to illegal activity by corporations, courts must be able
to impose damages even if the conduct in fact benefited the
company's bottom line. This requires recognizing interests
other than those of the shareholders. But neither the "net
loss" rule nor traditional Delaware fiduciary duty law does
this. The best solution to this problem is the one proposed by
Eisenberg within the context of the broad concept of loyalty
favored by the Delaware courts: holding the "disloyal"
directors liable for fines imposed on the company without
offsetting them by any gains achieved through the illegal
conduct. 4
Such a reform is possible, but only if courts are willing to
depart from their narrow, inward-looking view of the
damages arising from a director's breach of fiduciary duties.
Shareholders ought to be able to bring a derivative lawsuit
claiming disloyalty by directors who approve illegal conduct
regardless of whether the conduct benefitted the corporation's
bottom line. Their complaint must show, not that the conduct
hurt the corporation, but that it violated a rule designed to
protect stakeholders outside the corporation. By allowing
such a lawsuit and by imposing damages that arise from the
harm done to outside stakeholders (and ignoring any possible
benefit to the corporation), courts will bring Delaware's
powerful notion of loyalty in line with Eisenberg's vision of
the moral corporation as a necessary ingredient of a civil
society. The result is a small step away from the profit-
maximization standard and towards recognition of corporate
social responsibility.
93. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 31-32.
94. See id. at 37. Eisenberg notes that this reflects the rule in Section
7.18(c) of the Principles of Corporate Governance "which provides that a
manager's liability arising out of a wrongful transaction may not be offset by
gains to the corporation that arose out of the same transaction if the offset
would be contrary to public policy." Id. (emphasis added).
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